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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SXARR ADVERTISING, INC., ? 
a corpora ti011, 
Plaintiff, 
-YR.-
THE UTAH STATE TAX 
CO:\l:'.\IISSION, 
Defendant. \ 
Case 
Xo. 10808 
Petition for Rehearing 
and 
Brief in Support of Petition 
PETFI'IOK FOR RFJHEARING 
Th0 Utah Stat0 'rax Commission, defendant in the 
ahove-c'ntitlt>d matter, }IC'n·h~- petitions this honorable 
court for a rehearing of this case and a reconsideration 
of its decision dat0ll October 25, 1967. 
'l'lic sol<.' is~ml' prpsentecl i11 this case is whether or 
not a sales tax ma~· appropriatPly be imposed upon pay-
lllP11ts madP, under contract for advertising on outdoor 
painkd hillhoar<ls, to S11arr Advl'rtising from its custom-
('J'S or clients. 
1 
PRIOR DJSPOSl'J'ION 
This crtse came to this honorahle conrt on cNtiornri 
from a decision of the Utah State 1'ax Commission (here-
inafter ref erred to as the Commission). This decision, 
elated October 23, 1966 (R. 204-206) sustained a defi-
ciency assessment (R. 111-198) against Snarr ..:\dvertis-
ing, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Snarr). 
FJxactly oue year from the date of the Tax Com-
mission's decision, this honorable court reverSl'd that 
decision arnl founcl in fa\ror of plaintiff Snarr A<lver-
tisi11g, Inc. Chief Justice .T. Allan Crockett dissented, 
being of the opiuion that tlw d0cisiou of the> Utah State 
Tax Commission was proper and should be sustained. 
RELIEF SOUGH1' ON APPEAL 
Defeuclant seeks a reconsideration and reversal of 
ihe decision of this honorahle court elated October 2:), 
1967, aml a ruling that cu:-;tomers of plaintiffs haw the 
taxalJle right to possession or use of tm1gihll' property 
as those terms are used in Hepl. Vol. Utah Code A.1111. 
~· 59-15-2(g) (1963), acquired by eoutrnct or l<'ase in eon-
neetion with the outdoor aclvertisillg lmsines:-; of pl<1intiff. 
S'l'ATE::\IENT OF' FACTS 
1'here is no contro\rNs~r existing between the partil's 
as to the pertinent facts of this nrntter, most of 1d1ieh 
are presented to the court by stipnlaiiou (R. 10-12). 
Plai11tiff Snan Achertisi11g, lne., is <'11g·<1gecl iu tli<' 
business of ouMoOl' mhcrti:-;in!.!,'. Tn this jllrisr!ielio11 its 
2 
sq]e form of out<loor adnrtisiug (1isp1ay is the painted 
l>illhoard, eustom huilt for the particular client or cus-
toml~r ( R. 64), designed to hring the product, service, or 
place of lmsiness of the customer to the public's atten-
tion. The land upon which sucl1 a hillboanl might be 
plaeed may lwl011g to Snarr or the client, hut more typi-
eall>- ·will belo11g to a third party with whom Snarr has 
<'nt0red into a real estate lease agreement (R. 199). 
The agreements lwtween Snarr and its clients are 
fo1· long- tPrms, typicall~- three or four years. Snarr re-
tains the respo11si1Jilit~· to keep the billboard in good re-
pair dm·ing thP term of the agreement ancl may move it 
from 011e location to another with n comparable exposure 
fndor if the elil'llt appro,·0s such a moYe (R. 41-42). 
The deficiency assessment proposed by the auditing 
<fo·ision l>ronght the question hereto considered to the 
attention of the Utah State Tax Commission for the first 
1 im0. Tlw Commission, after an inYestigation aucl a hear-
iilg, deeidt~cl that a tax \Yas appropriate. 
It tlill so prinrn1·ily hasetl n1.>on its i11terpr0tation of 
the applicable statutory lmiguage and of thl' case of 
ru1111g Rlec. 8ig11 Co. v. State 1'a.r Corn111 '11, 4 Utah 2d 
242, 291 P.2d 900, deci(lNl h:· this honorable court in 
1 ~l:>3, alwnt whieh more will he said iu the argument sec-
t i1Jll of this brief. 
The legal question::-; presented in thi~ cas0 were 
hri<'frtl in (kpth by both sides for the original argument. 
'l'his ]Jrid will, therdore, eoncern itself so!Ply with the 
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reasons prompting this petition for rehearing· and wi 11 
repeat or comment upon material co11tai1wd in the brief 
originally filed only to the degree deemed 11ee(•ssary to 
insure intelligibility and continuity. 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINrl' I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PJ1_JR-
CEIVE THE REAL NATURE OF THE 
TRANSACTIONS INVOLVED AND TO COR-
RECTLY APPLY CONTROLLING LAW, AND 
DJ D"BJPAR'rING FROl\l AN APPROACH AND 
PHILOSOPHY EXPRESSED AND FOL-
LOWED IN PRIOR DFJCISIONS, IN 'rHE 
FOLLO-WING PARTICULARS: 
(1) IN FAILING TO ASCERTAIN 'l'HA'r THE 
TRANSACTIONS BET\V"l<JEN PLAIN-
TIFF AND ITS CLIENTS CRK\.'J'BJD IX 
SUCH CLIENTS A 'l'AXABL"BJ RIGHT '1'0 
POSSESSION AND USE OF TANGIBLbJ 
PERSONAL PROPFJRTY; 
(2) IN SUGGEsrrING THAT THE COST 
OF MATERIALS GOING INTO rrHJ<J 
SIGN AS OPPOS.BJD TO rrrnJ rroT AL 
RENTALS PAID HAS ~\.NY REAL PJ1jR-
TINENCE; 
(8) IN NEGLECTING 1'0 SA'l'ISJ<~AC'l'ORTLY 
DEFINE AND DEAL \VITH TlUJ STA'rr-
TORY LANGUAGJ1J ::\LAKING A CONTIN-
UOUS RIG HT 1'0 "USJ<J" '1'ANGlBLJ1J 
P:bJRSONAL PROPT1JH'l'Y TAXABL11J; 
( 4) IN l\"O'L' RI1j( ~OGNIZINU TH I1J ST1\HLAR-
1TY OF THIS SI'l'UATION TO 'l'!HJ 
CLASSIC" SALE TN D1SGUIS1'~" CASliJS; 
4 
(3) lX DRX\Yll\G 11\APPROPRIATE INFER-
EN<~J1JS FROJ\I PAST PRACTICES AND 
RULINGS OF TIUJ -UTAH STATE TAX 
CO,\lJ\IISSION; 
(6) lN UN"WARRANT"BJDLY F.JXTENDING 
THJ-iJ SCOP"1'J AND :MEANING OF COJ\I-
::\118SION RFJGULATIONS; 
(7) DJ OV:B~R11URNING \VI11 HOUT SUFFI-
( 'TENT .JUSTIFICATIO~ FACTUAL 
FINDINGS ~I ADE BY 'THE UTAH 
STATE 'l1AX CO~L\ITSSION THROUGH 
APPLTCATION OF ITS CONSIDER-
,\.BLE }-iJXPFJRIBJNCE AND EXPERTISE 
AFTER A l\IOST CAREFUL AND EX-
HAUSTIVE STUDY OF THE PROBLEM 
PRB~SFJNTFJD. 
It is rrspt>ctfull~' suhmitted that this honorable court 
made a nnmber of errors, some of grC'ater consequence 
than others, in its resolution of this case. In an effort 
to faeilitah• this rcYiew, we have attempted to specifi-
cally enumerate these even though the delineation is 
;.,onwwlint le>ss precisr than might have> been wished. All 
of the alleged points of error involn misapplication of 
1he controlling statntr [Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. ~ 
.-19-15-2(g-) (1061)] 1 to tlw pertinent facts. The statutory 
ln uguagC' provides : 
\Vhen rig-ht to continuous possession or use of 
any article of tangible personal property is 
grn11trd umlrr a lease or contract and such trans-
frr of posse>ssion would be taxable if an outright 
snh• Wl'l'e made, such lc-asC' or contract shall he 
eonsidert>(l thc- sale' of such article and the tax 
1 The use tax counterpart, differing only slightly, is Rep!. Vol. Utah Code 
Ann.§ 59-16-2 (k) ( 1963). 
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shall be computed arnl paid h)· the n•ndor or }p;.:-
sor upon the rentals paid. 
(1) The criterion of taxation 111 the statute above 
quoted is on the possession or use of tangible personal 
property. Some courts have, however, held that if such 
property is of nominal valu0 alld it passes only inci-
dentally to the rendering of a service, 110 taxable transac-
tion results since the senice rat her than the property is 
the basis of consideration in the agreement. This con-
cept is here inapplicable since no S()n·ice is rendered to 
customers of the plaintiff except through and in rela-
tion to the billboards. Indeecl, only i11 the hillhoanl is m1y 
value received for which Snarr could charge a client 
or for ·which the client would be willing to pay. ·we would 
thus respectfully submit that th0 ('8Se11ce of tlH•;.:e trans-
actions lies in the property itself rather in the n•ndering-
of any ''service.'' This problem is exhaustively Pxplored 
in the original briefs ancl will, therefore, not he helabore<l 
at this time, hut one relatccl point ·which we fe(•l to be of 
extreme significance needs to lw made in relati011 then•to. 
The cases dealing with the '':-;en· ice'' as oppo:-;ed to 
"sale of property" problem ha ,.c a ri:-;en fort he rno:-;t part 
i11 contcxt:s of outright sales wherei11 some article of 
property is actually tra11sfenecl from tlH' \"clldor to the 
n•nclec, totally ancl permanent!>·, rather tlurn in situation;.: 
involving leases or use ngre<•me11t:-;. See, for ()xmupl(', 
('usick , .. C0111 n10mccaJtl1, 260 K~., 204, 84 S.\V. 2d 1+ 
(1933): Peo11!c ex re!. TT'alker E11.r1rori11q ('o. Y. ri'rorcs, 
24:3 App. Di,·. G:J2, 2/G N.Y.S. 614, aff. 2(i8 .'J.Y. fi-1-8, 1!l8 
X.E. 339 (19:\:J) arnl other (·as(';.: cit('<l 011 pp. 1-1 a!l(l 1:-J 
6 
of tlH• ( 'mnmissio11 's original brief. rl'he rule of law is 
idc•11tical in both frames of rdere11re; if a 11ontaxable 
sPnie<' is tl1P basis of the co11sicleration, 110 excise tax 
ca11 lie 011 propert~· trm1sfenr(l inei<leutally to the ren-
d(•ri11g of tl1at seni<'e, hut if the property is the thing 
coutraet<•cl for, then the tax should be imposed on the 
total (•011si<lc•ratiou for thP property arnl integral services 
as wl'll. 2 
111 thP penultimak paragraph of tlw main opinion, the 
c-onl't couclndPs that what Snarr gives its customers "is a 
se1Ti<'l'.'' If this were so, there could he no sales tax 
,,·hethC'r thP hillbonnls were sold, lease<l or erected under 
tl1P terms of contract of use, since there is no tax on 
adn:rfo.;i11g services as such in this juriscliction. 3 How-
en•r, at the beginning of the sixth paragraph in the 
cu11 rt 's opi11i(m ihe followi11g sta tc>meut appears: "There 
can lw 110 doubt tliat if the tm1gible sign only was sold to 
a customvr, a tax 011 the sale price would be due.'' Since 
tiH· sl'n·iec• rernlncd h~· Snarr, i.e., bringing to the at-
tt•11tio11 of thP public the clic•nt's business, would be iden-
tical ,,·Jiether a sale wPre made or a lease arrangement 
c•xistecl it follows that this statement is not consistent 
\\ ith the' co11clusio11 statecl later in the opi11io11 that a 
sen·ice rather than tangible propert~' is involved. If 
the eustomers are dealing for a serYiee when they enter 
into the n.::iste11t contrads, they would he dealing for a 
service if they bought the signs since the benefit and 
Yalue the~· recein, for whieh the• eo11sideration is giwn, 
would bt• rprnlitatively no different. If 110 tax is due here 
"Rep! Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 59-16-2 (d) (1963). 
'See references in Point III of Snarr's original brief. 
7 
because the real nature of th<' trn11sactio11 is the i·m1-
dering of a service, no tax could lie dur if the signs were 
bought since the real nature of the transaction would still 
be the rendering of a service. Conversely, if a tax would 
have been imposed on the sale price if the property were 
sold, what Snarr gives its customers cannot be a non, 
taxable service. 
r_rhis internal inconsistency in the mam opinion is 
not one of academic concern only, but one which could 
create serious practical problems in administration in 
the future and perhaps necessitate further litigatio11. 
Where there was clarity, tlwre is now opaqueness. 
Of the errors pointed out in the first point of this 
brief, this is perhaps the most significant and ultimately 
may have the most far-reaching consequences. 
( 2) The attention of the court should be redirected 
to two problems in this area. First, it has been urged 
that the actual cost of the signs was fifteen percent of 
the rentals. It should be noted that according to Snarr 's 
own computation ( p. 33 of plaintiff's brief) the eighty-
five percent supposedly represented in the value of the 
billboard itself includes such items as lighting which 
might most logieally be considered part of the physical 
finished product. And further, the repair and mainte-
nance items are not broken down to show what part of 
them is based 011 materials and what part involves labor. 
This 85-15 breakdown seems, therefore, somdhing less 
than precise. 
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~eco11d, a11d far more important, en'Jl if the hreak-
llown is valid, the conclusion drawn, mostly inferentially, 
from these figures that what is involved in essence is a 
service, is erroneous. It is obvious (as explored at some 
length in the original brief submitted by the state) that 
the price paid for a finished product is often far in ex-
cess of the cost of the component materials. A skilled 
s:<11tltesis of materials by a craftsman, such as a watch-
maker, a tailor, or a sculptor, can create something of 
such beauty or utility that its worth is greatly in excess 
of the cost of component materials. It is still the finished 
product that is bargained for, and the worth of the in-
spiration and labor of the craftsman are reflected in the 
price or fee required to buy or rent such product. The 
eourt fom1d this to he true in the case of a prosthetics 
manufacturer in .McKendrick v. State Tax Comm'n, 9 
lltah 2d 418, 347 P.2d 177 (1949). It seems only con-
sistent that it should be also true of the creations of the 
talented artists and craftsmen employed by plaintiffs . 
.N" ot an examination of a mathematical breakdown, but 
mt her an m1alysis of tht> basis for the consideration pass-
iug hetwce11 the parties, would seem to be the proper 
method to g<>t to tlw con' of this problem. 
(:~) The statutory language previously quoted sets 
up alternative criteria for tax imposition. Tax may be 
impoSl'll upon either the right to c011tiuuous possession 
of tm1gi h k, 1wrsonal property m1der lease or contract, or 
the rigl1t to eo11ti11uous 11s0 of taugible personal property 
11i1dPr lPHSl' or cont met. Th(• court correctly recognizes 
tl1at th0 ouly use of the' billboard the customer obtains is 
tl1nt tl1l' hillhoanl directs the attention of the public to 
9 
the customer's product or service. \re would re;;pedfull:-· 
suggest that not only is this a suffiei<'11t use to justify 
tax imposition, but this is the 01tly use to which these 
billboards can profitably be put, and the sole purpose for 
which they were built. If a customer had an uncontro-
,·ertecl perpetual fee title to one of tl10s0 billhoanls, he 
could get 110 more use of it than he gets m1der the leases 
or contracts herein im·olvec1. 
Since this is the only use to which these particular 
articles of tangible personal pl'Operty could be put, it 
seems axiomatic that it should satisfy the statute. rrhe 
court's failure to recog11i2e this has the cffoct of chang-
ing the intent of the legislature in eliminating for all 
intents and purposes the possibility of taxation of any 
right of continuous use in this type of transaction and 
a number of related types of transactions. 
( 4) The main opinion clearly obsen·es tlrnt the leg-
i;;la ti on of which Repl. Vol. Utah Code :\ rn1. ·~ :-J9-L>-2 ( g) 
(1963) is a prototype had its origin i11 mi attempt to stop 
lease practices which were lwcomi11g prevalent a frw 
decades ago, which were uot k•gitimatc lc'ascs so mnch 
as sal0s i11 disguise. ·while it is trne tlrnt tlie operation 
of these statutes has in some instm1ccs exh~Jl(kcl be-
yond tlw c lassie <lisguised sal f, si tua ti on, most of the 
cases, particularly the okle1· ones, innilvr> tra11sactio11s 
that \\'Oniel fit this chnracteriz.ntio11. 
The main opinion cites t 11<> C'X<lrnple of a t,YpewritN 
lcns<'ll for the t1urntion of its op<'rnli\<' lil'<>, \\ i1l1 n·n1<1~:-: 
sufficieut to illsnrc a profit to 111<· s<']l('l'-l<•:-;:-:01·. Thi:-: 
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1s a typical (lisguiReu sale, as \\'Oulcl be the rental of a 
(·om1mt<•r or other lmsiness machine, a 1011g-term re11tal 
of a ear or other motor ,·ehicle, or the rental of machin-
ery which woukl he worn out during the term of its ren-
tal alHl therefore 11ot reusable by another. The classic 
ease i11YOlYing this last situation is U11icersal E11g 'r Co. 
"· /->'fate Bd. of Eq11olizatio11, 256 P.2d 1059 (Cal. 1953), 
sourrc of the "substantial consumption" test sometimes 
npplicll in thes<~ eases. In 1955, this C'omt found that a 
long-term ll•ase of a custom built electric sign would 
com<• within the Jllll'Yiew of this legislation. 4 
Jn the instant ease a painted billboard is especially 
plarnml, u11iqnely <ksig1w<l aml custom built to fit the 
requirements of a giYen advertiser arnl leased to that 
nrln,rtiser for an extcncle(l period, usually three or four 
yea rs ( R. 81). Since the sign advertises a particular 
prod net, :-;en·iec or establishment, it could neYer be bene-
fiein l ly used, as prepared, h~Y anyone else. A great deal 
"f planning·, i<lea enilution, artistic design and finish-
ing h)· the> l'Xeellent craftsmen employed by plaintiff go 
into the preparatio11 of such a l1il1board (indeed, plain-
tiff has uq.~·c·<l forcefully that the ,·alue of these is far 
more than the Yaiuc of the materials in the billboard) 
\\·hi«l1 can lll'\'er benefit anyone except one customer. 
~ill('C the l>illhoanls ai·e usually cut in very distinctive 
c-:1in1w:-; it i:-; <''drcmcly un1ikP1y tlwt the billboard could 
he• 11:-;<•<l by painti11g o\·cr the m<'Ssage of another adver-
tiser; iudee<l, then• is 110 eYidrnce in the record that 
l Yuu11r, E/ec. Sign Co. V. State Tax Comnz'n, .:\Utah 2:12, 291 P.2d 900. 
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this has ever happened. F'nrtl1er, tlH' record ~mggpsts 
that very seldom is eve11 part of the material n•usPcl h~­
being built into another sign since it is "easier to start 
over rather than reuse part of a s1g11 already lmilt.'' 
(R. 82) 
The similarity lwtweeu a t~·pe,niter rented for its esti-
mated usual life, a machine drill re11tecl for its estimate<l 
useful life>, a motor vehicle rented for the estimated use-
ful life, and a billboard rented for what is almost cer-
tainly its estimated useful life seems most obvious. 111-
deecl, the "sale in disguise" label seems to fit particu-
larly well the instant transactious sinc0, unlike a type-
writer or motor vehicle, these billboards are custom pre-
pared and could not Le profital1ly used 1Jy anyone hut the 
customer for whom they are prepared. \Vere a customer 
to default on his payments or break his contract, the sigu 
(unlike a typewriter) could not he re-rented hut would 
simply han to he written off. Chid .TnstieP Crockett in 
his dissenting opinion clearl>- perceh·es that "this is the 
very type of transaction iu '.vhich thp statute rc•ferrt>d to 
was designed to prt>vent the use of a least> instead of a 
sale as a su bt<,rfnge to escape paymt>11t of a sal0s tax.'' 
tice: 
( 5) From the dissenting opi11io11 of the ChiPf .J us-
rr1w poi11t made that some importai1ce should be 
attached to the· fact that the' Commission has uot 
heretofor0 tax0d these• hillhoard tnmsactio11s is 
uot persuasive. rl'he reconl is devoid of all>" in-
dication that the matter has p\·er pr0viously lwen 
hcforc the Commission, or that it has made n11;· 
tlekrmill a ti on t hereo11. 
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The Commissio11 's cletermina ti on in the instant case does 
not represe>11t the reversal of a position previously taken 
hut the initial taking of a position. But even if it were 
a re\·ersal, this wonhl not prevent the Commission from 
eorreding its own enor ancl attempting to collect a tax 
legally clue, as correetly noted in the main opinion. 
There is t0stimony in the record to the effect that 
there was gi \"en several years ago an "oral ruling" by 
:\Ir. Paul Holt, chief auditor of the State Tax Commis-
sion, to the effoct that there \rnuld be no tax on trans-
actions such as those presently before the court. This 
point was strongly urged hy counsel for plaintiff at the 
initial argument. 
It is clear that eYen if ::\[r. Holt had taken such a po-
sition the Commission would not be bound thereby. 5 Mr. 
Holt's own testimony, however, is in direct contradic-
tion to the testimony relied 011 by counsel for plaintiff. 
From the record (R. 106-107): 
P.n·L :\f. HoLT recalled as a ·witness on b0half of 
th0 Commissio11, liaving hPPll previously sworn, 
kstifie(l as follows: 
By ::\IH. HnnEH: 
(~. You h;we heard refrre>nce earlier in this hear-
ing· to n rom·ersation h0hYPC'll yoursp]f and a gen-
tlf'rrnm e01H·0rni11g outdoor aclv0rtising in which 
>·on purportetll)' told this gentleman that this 
tnw of sen·ire or property we are invoked 
with totln>· woul<l lw exempt from taxation. Do 
)"OU n'memlwr this conYersation ! 
s E. C. OiH'n Co. v. State Tax Com11t'11, 109 Utah 563, 168 P.2d 342 
\ Fl46 J. 
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A. Xo. 
Q. Do yon en'r n~mernJicq· telling <Ul)'OllC' it woukl 
not be taxable'? 
A. N" ot to my lrnowlcdgt>. 
( 6) The main opinion makes rdereuce to two Com-
mission regulations. The first regulation, S65, co11tai11s 
the follffwing language: 
Advertising space ::,;ol(l to newspapers, rnagazi1ws, 
or otherwise is not subject to tax. (Em1Jhasis sup-
plied by court.) 
"\Ve would respectfully suggest that the phrase ''or oth-
erwise," follffwi11g the specific 1'den'ner to 1w\rnpapcrs 
and magazines, would h:Y application of both common 
sense awl the (1octrirn• of c)11sdem ge11eris rpfer sole!:'-' 
to pe1·iodicals. As clear!>- noted ill the (1issenting opin-
ion a hilll;oanl is quite a different thing altogdhcr, exist-
i11g at a llefinite point in time arn1 space \\'itli the possi-
l1ilit)- of a continuous i1ossession or use of it. 
There are different typc•s of mlYertising mec1ia and 
there is no reason "\d1y the selectioH of 011C' media rather 
than a not her need gi \'C' rise to the same t nx cons<'q lWHces. 
Indeed, this is n•cognizec1 and nllrnit tr(1 b)- plaintiffs arnl 
others like situated sinc·C' th('Y lwn: ahnt)'S pilid tax 011 
property used in ''gimmick'' ath·edisi11g, such as pens, 
pencils, balloons, letter opc·1H'1'S auc1 lmmper sticker." 
(R. 58-60) en•n t110ngh the nse of tl1<'sP tnK's of tHlvt>1'-
tising mate1·ials is fo1' the YPry sanw purpose as the use 
of pc•rioc1icals, airways and l1illhom·ds, i.c•., lJl"ingi11µ; to 
the atkntioll of tlH• imhlic the product or senice of the 
particular athertist•r. 
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Also citecl is an excerpt from regulation S32 \vhich 
:-;tates that the tax shall apply in transactions such as 
those lwfon• the court when the lessee has the right to 
nse and 01H~ratc the tangible personal property in ques-
tion. It is sul)mittecl that any use and operation of the 
propert:v which is the suhject of this action is in the 
ll•ssee-eustomer with the sole exception of the mainte-
nance and repair res11onsibility which often, indeed al-
most always, is performed by a person other than the 
owner of any piece of property 1wcanse of the special 
competence and technical ahility required. 
l<'inally, it should be remembered that regulations 
mnst lw eonstrned in conformity with the statutory lan-
guage they interpret and that this statutory language, 
not the regulatory language, ultimately controls. 
(I) I 11 its llecision, after an extensive review of the 
testimo11)· presented and the documentary evidence sub-
mitted at the hearing, the Tax Commission in a formal 
cll'risi 011 ( R. :204-:206) fourn1 that clients of petitioner 
ncquiretl both a rig'l1t of continuous possession and a 
right of e011ti11no11s use of the painted billboards involved 
in the agreeIDl'llts entered into between these riarties and 
that this class of hansartion comes ·within the purview 
ot' the lm1gnag·c of RPpl. Vol. l! tah Uotle Ann.~· 39-15-2 ( g) 
(196:-l). 
The UomrnissitJ11, as an admini:strative ageney, is a 
tirnlPr of fact \d10sc fi.ndiugs '"·ill 11ot be overturned "un-
lt',;s ... clL':w1y ('lT011eo11R. '' :lfc](em1rick v. State Tax 
('11111.111 '11, ~l etah ~tl 418, :;.t/ P.2tl 177 (19-l~J). See also 
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TVesteni Leather & Fi11ding \'. ,",'fate Tax Cou11n'11, 81 
l'tah 227, 48 P.2cl 526 (1~35). The~e prio1· c·asPs from 
this eourt arc totally ronsisteHt \\·ith the ge11eral rule in 
the area, and while this eourt clear]~· has a broad enough 
scope of review to reverse an~· and all of the findings of 
the Commission (or auy other state agency, for that 
matter) shonl<l it choose to do so, it has iu the past, con-
sistent with tlw philosophy ahon• expressed, exercised 
considerable restraint in so doing. This caution is au 
expression of the recognition that a Commission's fact-
finding knowledge and experience in its field are ro11-
siderable, and that Commission members have heard the 
actual testimony, examined the exhibits, and investigate<l 
the problems involved, and are thus in a specially oppor-
tune pllsition to ma kt• findings a ml determi11a tions. 
Notwithstanding the above, this court has here on•r-
tumed thc• factual findings made l>y the Tax Commission, 
some expr0ssly and some by imp lie a tion. vVe respeet-
fnlly suhmit that such o\·erturni11g is not consistent with 
the prt>pomlerance of eYidence in tlw rc•cord nor is it con-
sistent with the philosoph~v previous]~· expresse(l arnl 
practieecl by this court. 
There is no ne0<l to explore this point further smce 
the cfo;sent of Chief .Justice Crockett concerns itself pri-
marily with this problPm arnl :-<tates <>loqnt>ntly why tlw 
C'ourt might well us0 more restraint in overturning the 
findings of m1 a<lmi11istnitiYC' agC>11ey i11 gC'11eral, and i11 
this case i11 partieulm. 
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POINT II 
1'H:BJ :F'AILURBJ OF THE COURT TO EITHER 
OV~RRULE, l\IODIFY, OR DISTINGUISH 
TlHJ YOUNG ELECTRIU SIGN CASE (IN 
THE :JIA.JORITY OPINION) CANNOT BUT 
RESULT IN CONFUSION, INEQUITY, AND 
FURTHER LITIGATION, AND CREATES AN 
B~XTRE"MELY DIFFICUI/r ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROBLEl\I FOR THOSE CHARGED BY 
LA \V \VITH THFJ ADMINISTRATION AND 
ENFORCE~IENT OF OUR REVENU:B~ LAWS. 
On the southeast corner of the intersection of Sixth 
South and State Rtreets, perched atop the True-Fit Seat 
CoYCrs huildi11g, is a large painted hillhoarcl announcing 
that "things happrn at .John S. Ascuaga's Nugget in 
Sparks, Nevada.'' Accompanying the lettering are pic-
torial repn•se11tations of the various activities to be en-
jo~·ed at this pleasure emporium. Below the sign is a 
small identification, establishing this to be the creation 
of Snarr ~\th·erti sing, Inc. This is one of the signs which 
was i1n·olved in the instant proceedings, and the recent 
< keision of th is court tletermined that a sales tax impo-
sition 011 the contractual payments for the use of this 
sign wonld not lw uot proper. 
On the identical comer three blocks to the south, 
atop the :\lonison Brnthers Auto Supply, a passer-by 
\YOuld notice a similar entict'ment to ,·isit a competing 
locale' in our :-;i:-;ter state to the \Vest. It reads, "Visit 
the fun spot of the world, Hotel Fremont and Casino, 
Las Vegas, :\ l'Vatla.'' 'I1he artwork on this sign includes 
m1 electrie anow directing the attention of the v1e\ver 
in the• ge11<'ral lwining of l 'lark County, Nevada. Imme-
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diatel:· below tlw stg11 the name '• Yo1111g J 1~ll·ctric Sig11 '' 
appea.rs, identifying it as thr product of that firm. 'l'his 
eourt in 1933 deterrniurd that contractual payments for 
the use or lease of this type of sig11 arr proprrly snbjeets 
for salrs taxation. Yu11ng Elec. 8ig11 ('orJJ. v. State Tax 
Comm 'n, supra. Yonng has hren charging and remitting 
a sales tax 011 its rrntal. 
Both of thesr signs atfompt to attnwt local rcsi<le11ts 
aml passersby to crnten.; of rc•vrlry in ~C'vacla. Both arp 
constructed off tlw premises of the bnsinrssc's they ad-
\'C'rtise, under similar real estate usr contracts. They 
a re of a ppro:xima tely the same s izc arnl pe1·mm1encc and 
havr artwork of ahout the same· qualit:·. The:· differ 
only in that one has a hit of 11eo11, whereas the other 
tloes not. 
The fact that the rental pnymc11ts 011 011e of thcsr 
signs are tax-free, wherC'as thr rental pa:·me11ts on the 
other arc• taxable, illustrates tlH• <1clministrative dilemma 
the Utah State 'rax Commission fi]l(ls itself in. 
Aclmittctlly, not all of Yotmg 's pJeetric sig11s are as 
similar to Srnur's signs as in this illnstrntio11. :'.\fost of 
the signs i11 the Yo1m.r1 case, as 11ote<l i11 thr original 
hriefs, werr on the prcmisc•s of the client arnl utilize<l 
primaril:· for lmsincss iclentificati011 rather than adver-
tising purposes. Some, howe,·c1", \\·rrc allcl arc off the• 
premises of the client urnl sen·r sold.\· an a(h·crtising 
function. Similarly, th<' largr hulk of the Snan siglls 
arc not 011 the premis<•;.; of tit<_• cn;.;tornt•r nrnl arc used 
for a(h·crtisi11g, lmt again this is not, nor will it he, 
always tnw. 'l'hp1·0 is co11si<l(•1·ahlc' <'X<ld o\·erlap and in 
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this n rea of l'Xact overlap the decisions are inconsistent. 
l,~,·en whHe diffrrrnt, the difference seems slight, cer-
tainl>· not significant enough to justify the polar rulings. 
In thr specific instances ahove cited, if the only dif-
ferrnee between the X ugget sign and the Fremont sign 
is tlic· lll'esence of some iwon ligltting, is the Commission 
to conside1· the presence or absence of neon as the deter-
minati,·e factor wlH)n no other differences exist? If so, 
<111 what statutory language might they rely to justify 
snch seemingly tenuous uistinctio11? Aml further, as-
suming (a most questionable assumption) that this is a 
,.a lill llistinction and that neon signs are per se taxable 
and paint<>d signs per se tax exempt, what will happen 
when thr Commission lie faced with (as it may \Yell be, 
consi<lrring teelrnological changes) a sign composed of 
metal, plastic or another substance that is neither paint 
eo\·ere<l 11or neon? '\V ouhl the Commission then he re-
q ull'ecl to <leterminP whether the new substance is more 
likl· paink-<l \\'OO<l or more like neon, or would it 1)(• nec-
essan· to stm't nt the beginning to ohtain a new ruling? 
Or, perhaps, it is tlie location rather than the substance 
which is eontrolling; if the sign is on the user's realty, 
:-houl<l it he taxPcl, Hll(l t)xrmpted if two feet off? 
f['hese aml other problems present thPmselYes 111 
;111>~ attempt to recoueilP tlw hol<ling of the court in the 
i11stai1t eas<' nml in the You11q Electric Sign decision. If 
the' mniu opinion i11 this case hml ovennled or modified 
ill<' 1'01111q F:ledric Sign ca::;e or mnclc a meaningful fac-
t nn I distillction 1Jc•twcen tlw hrn situations there \\'Ould 
1,e 110 insurmrnrntn1Jle aclrni11istrntin• problem of recon-
vil iatioH. ll(rn ('Yer, the main opinion in the instant case 
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mak0s 110 rcferenee whats<il'\'<•1· to th<' Yo1111g Electric 
Sign ck•cisiou in spite of th0 fact that tht• Tax Commis-
sion in its brief and in its argument relied npo11 that cast> 
as controlling, quoti11g from it at le11gth and maki11g ref-
erence to it in a munlwr of contexts. The Ymmg Electric 
S'ign case is not only the closest preced.:>nt to the i1rntant 
case in this state, it is - with one possible exception 6 -
the clo:,;est case preccdC'nt i11 any jnrisdiction in the 
country. 
\V c rccogniz<' that the court coulcl sol Ye this prohlC'm 
and correlate the two ckcisions ·without re,·ersi11g the 
rnling ma<le in this case. \Y <' would suggest that this 
would l1ring about a solution but would further snggest 
respectfully that equity and jnsticc would hest be serwcl 
by a revenml of the cleeisio11 rce011tl>· issued, and tlw 
preparation of a new decision consistent with the prin-
c·i ples nml philosophy articnlatl>d in the Young decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The State~ Tax Commission of Utah in its capacity as 
an aclministratiYe finder of fact cldermiHPd after a car0-
fnl investigation and au extemled hearing, at which con-
sidera hle 0Yiclence both oral and <locurne11t a ry ·was pr0-
sentecl, that in the class of tnrnsactions, which are the sub-
ject matkr of this action, the customt>rs of Snarr Ad-
vertising, Inc., obtained both a right of co11tinuous pos-
session aml a right of continuous use of certain paint<'d 
l>illboards prepare1l l)y plaintiff, nrnl that the paym0nts 
made pursmmt to contrnet nr<' snhjPd to sales tax umlt•r 
6 Federal Sign & Signal Corp. V. Bowers. 174 N.E. 2d 91 (Ohio 1961) 
presents an almost identical fact situation but a statutory frame of ref-
erence significantly at variance with our own. 
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the prnvi8ious of Rep!. Vol. Utah Code A1111. ~ ;)9-13-2 ( g) 
( 1963). It is respectfully submitted that this court has 
o\·erhum'd these findings, which according to its own 
philosophy and rule should not be disturbed unless clearly 
erroneous, without sufficient justification, and based on 
an incorrect determination as to the basic nature of the 
<'Xisti11g transactions. 
::\lore particularly, the court failed to recognize that 
this is a prototype of a classic sales in disguise situa-
tion, arnl that a rental ancl use of tangible personal prop-
erty is actually invoked since the clients of Snarr could 
obtain nothiug of Yalue apart from or aside from the 
billboards in questiou. The court also failed to recognize 
that the Tax Commission in its ruling did not reverse a 
stand previously taken hut has taken an initial position 
since the problem was brought to its attention for the 
first time, aml further that the Commission regulations 
discussPd in the briefs and in the main opinion are not 
i11eo11sistent with the stand now taken hy the Commission 
hut refer to trnusactions which are iu sen~ral particulars 
mllike the instant transactions. 
The mai11 opinion is internally contradictory in stat-
i11g finit that there is 110 tloubt that if the signs in ques-
tion were sold a tax on the sales price would be due and 
in later observing that the <'ssence of the type of transac-
tion herein involved is the performing of a sen-ice rather 
thau the trausaction of property, for reasons set forth in 
Point I ( 1). This inconsistency in the opinion could well 
i·esult in eo1rnidPrahle confusion for 11oth administrators 
<!llll taxpayen; alike in future ~'e:ws, and may necessitate 
elnrifying litigation. 
21 
~lost sig11ificn11tly, it is n•sJH•e1fuli)· :-rnhmitted that 
this rourt has rreakd an extn•nwl:· clififrult administra-
tin:' situation by failing to me11tion in an)· frame of rd-
erenr<' i11 its main opi11io11 tl1e eas<• of fo1111,r7 Eler" 1~'i,r;11 
Co. , .. State Tax Commissio11, supra, dc•eidcd h:· this 
C'OUrt in 19:J:J. rrhe state reli<'d llJ>Oll this ("USC' as ('Oll-
troJli11g in the instant c·o11troy0rsy, hotl1 i11 its own de('i-
sio11-maki11g procP:-:s and in its argnm<•nts hpfore tl1is 
eourt, and the failure of this court to c•itlwr o\·errtdl', 
modify, <listi11guish or othPrwise n•eoneile that case "·ill 
han:> m1fortnnatP ramificntiorn; 011 fnture tnx ndminis-
tration. 
To implemc11t the "·ill of thC' Jeg:islatun', to do snli-
stnutinl justirP to nll people in the outdoor n<1'·ertising 
ln1siness, to Pliminat<' any possihilit.'' of di:·wrimi11ati011 
nucl m1fairness iu tax admi11istrntio11, to facilitate the ad-
mi nistrn tio11 of our re\·emw Jcrn·s h:--· those• ('ha rgl•cl \Vi t Ii 
sueh <:Hlmi11istratio11, to a\·oi<l llllll<'l'<•ssary fntur0 Jitiga-
tiou, and to maintai11 eo11sist<·rn·y with prin<'iples and 
philosophy stated in 1n·e\·iuus c1Peisio11s of this eomt, it 
is n~spPc·tfully arnl earnest!:--· urgvd at this tinw tlrnt this 
l1onornble eourt grant this Jll'tition for reh<•<1ri11g-. 
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